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Stocker cattle ownership is compared to contract grazing using stochastic simulation.  Returns 
are evaluated for both cattle owners and caretakers in contract grazing agreements.  For 
caretakers, contract grazing is significantly less risky than cattle ownership.  For cattle owners, 
contracting reduces risk only slightly while significantly reducing expected returns. 
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Stocker Cattle Ownership vs. Contract Grazing: a Comparison of Risk-Adjusted Returns 
 
 
With a temperate climate, abundant forage, and an extensive marketing infrastructure, the 
Southeastern U.S. is well-suited to beef cattle production.  Traditionally, most beef operations in 
the southeast have been oriented toward cow/calf production, with calves being sold at or shortly 
after weaning; however, grazing stocker calves has also been an important enterprise for a 
significant number of producers. 
  Statistics on the size of the southeastern stocker grazing/backgrounding industry are not 
readily available.  In any case, the stocker industry is likely not as large as it could be.  Each fall, 
thousands of southeastern calves are shipped to wheat pastures and feedlots in the High Plains.  
Table 1 provides some evidence regarding the extent of stocker grazing/backgrounding activities 
in the Southeast.  It appears from the information summarized in this table that in most southern 
states a relatively small percentage of calves (other than perhaps replacement heifers) remain on 
the farm post-weaning.  For example, the number of stocker/feeder steers and heifers on farms in 
Florida on January 1, 2002, represented just over 5% of the previous year’s calf crop.  For 
Virginia, that percentage was 34%, the highest for the 11 southeastern states reported here. 
  Stocker grazing/backgrounding represents a relatively simple means of adding value to 
calves; however, it is a value-adding opportunity that many producers may not view as attractive 
for a number of reasons.  Cash flow obligations may compel some producers to sell calves at 
weaning; other producers may lack access to capital required to purchase calves.  Producers may 
also view grazing/backgrounding as too risky—particularly if money must be borrowed to 
purchase calves or if loan payments must be deferred to retain calves.   
  In view of the capital constraints facing many producers, contract grazing of stocker 
calves is a production alternative that may have much appeal in the Southeast.  Under this   2
system, a cattle owner contracts with a caretaker to graze cattle on pasture that is owned or 
leased by the caretaker.  This paper will examine the advantages and disadvantages of contract 
grazing in the Southeast.  The objective of this paper is provide information to cattle and pasture 
owners that will assist them in making contract grazing decisions.  Specifically, this paper will 
examine various contractual arrangements and grazing fee rates from the perspective of both the 
cattle owner and the pasture owner.  The impact on returns over variable costs for each of these 
parties under different contract terms will be calculated.  The effect of risk on grazing decisions 
will be accounted for in the analysis by calculating certainty equivalents for both cattle and 
pasture owners assuming varying degrees of risk aversion. 
Use of Contracts in Livestock Production 
The use of contracts in livestock production has been widespread since the 1950s.  Contracting 
has undoubtedly been more common in the poultry industry than in the beef or pork industries; 
however, contract pork production has increased dramatically over the past decade.  Contracting 
in the beef industry has been less prevalent than in either the pork or poultry industries, though 
the practice in the fed cattle sector has fostered a great deal of debate (e.g., see Ward et al.).   
  Contracts can be classified as one of two general types: marketing contracts or production 
contracts.  A marketing contract represents an agreement between a contractor (buyer) and a 
producer (seller) that establishes a price (or method for determining price) and other terms and 
conditions under which a product will be exchanged.  Production contracts establish which 
inputs into the production process will be provided by the contractor and which will be provided 
by the producer.  The contractor also specifies how the producer will be compensated for his 
contribution to the production process.     3
  Johnson et al. examine the use of contracts by farmers using data from USDA’s farm 
costs and returns survey.  They found that in 1993, only 2% of cattle farms used either marketing 
or production contracts.  The value of production under both types of contract represented 23% 
of the value of production on these farms.  By contrast, nearly 89% of poultry farms used 
contracts, and some type of contractual arrangement covered 86% of the total value of 
production on poultry farms.  Summarizing results of a study by USDA’s Agricultural Risk 
Management Service conducted in 1997, Banker and Perry report that less than 10% of the value 
of cattle was sold under marketing contracts and that 14% of the value of cattle production was 
produced under some type of production contract.   
  From a producer’s standpoint, contracting offers several important advantages.
1  For one 
thing, contracts allow producers and contractors to share production and marketing risks.  In 
reducing risks, contracts contribute stability to a producer’s income.  Contracts may also give 
producers access to technology and/or technical expertise that they would not have access to on 
their own.  Such technological advantages improve the efficiency of production.  Contracts also 
ensure that producers have an outlet for their production—as long as specifications set forth in 
the contract are met.  Finally, contracting often benefits producers whose access to capital is 
limited.  By reducing risks, contracts can improve the producer’s creditworthiness.  More 
importantly, production contracts generally specify that a significant portion of inputs will be 
provided by the contractor, thus significantly reducing the producer’s need for capital and 
relieving some cash flow burdens.  
  Of course, contracts are not without their disadvantages.  Clearly, the reduction in risk 
accompanying the use of contracts will most generally be expected to come at the expense of 
lower average returns.  In addition, the use of contracts—particularly production contracts—will   4
require the producer to give up some degree of autonomy.  Finally, producers who depend on 
contract production to ensure sufficient income to pay for investments in facilities and/or 
equipment may find it difficult to ever terminate the contractual arrangement.  Even worse, if the 
contractor decides to terminate the contract, producers may find themselves with no way to 
service debt on highly fixed assets. 
Contract Grazing 
Contract grazing arrangements would generally fall under the category of production contracts.  
In a typical contract grazing arrangement, a cattle owner contracts with a caretaker to turn calves 
out on pasture owned or leased by the caretaker.  The caretaker is paid a yardage fee (a flat 
charge per day on pasture under the caretaker’s management), a set amount per pound of gain for 
the time the cattle are in his care, or some combination of yardage and a per pound of gain fee.  
Any number of arrangements are possible regarding which inputs will be provided by the owner, 
which by the seller, and who will bear the cost of death loss.  These items should be clearly 
spelled out in a written contract (Kidwell). 
  Relatively little academic work has been done on the issue of contract grazing.  In a 
related vein, May et al. look at pasture rental agreements from a resource management 
perspective, investigating how different pasture rental arrangements affect stocking rate 
decisions.  They find that per acre agreements result in 2% higher stocking rates than per head 
lease rates.   
  Johnson, Spreen, and Hewitt compare contract grazing to integrated production.  Using 
stochastic dominance techniques, they find that from a pasture owner’s perspective, contract 
grazing dominates cattle ownership at any per pound of gain payment rate greater than $0.45.  At 
a payment rate of less than $0.08/lb of gain, owning cattle dominated contract production from 
                                                                                                                                                             
1 For a more detailed discussion of the advantages of contract production see Johnson et al. and Sporleder.   5
the pasture owner’s perspective.  This results in a wide range of payment rates over which the 
preferred alternative is indeterminate.   
  In a similar study, Harrison et al. find that contract grazing significantly reduces risks for 
pasture owners but not for cattle owners.  This finding is broadly consistent with Johnson, 
Spreen, and Hewitt.  Both of these studies are limited to considering contracts for which payment 
is made on a per pound of gain basis.  Moreover, although different payment rates are 
considered, contracts do not differ in terms of who is providing various inputs (cattle owner or 
pasture owner). 
Teegerstrom et al. investigate several different ownership options for cattle producers.  
Using decision theory analysis to compare cow/calf production, ownership of summer stocker 
calves, and contract grazing, they find that the optimal alternative could be cow/calf production 
or contract grazing, depending on the decision theory criteria used to evaluate the decision.  They 
also use portfolio analysis to define the optimal combination of pasture rental (i.e., renting 
owned pasture to somebody else), contract grazing, summer stocker ownership, and cow/calf 
production.  With this approach, they find that for slightly to moderately risk averse producers, 
the optimal portfolio consists of renting pasture to somebody else and contract grazing.  As risk 
aversion increases beyond that level, renting out pasture becomes the only activity in the optimal 
portfolio.   
  This study will compare various contract grazing arrangements to stocker ownership.  
The issue will be examined from the perspective of both the caretaker and the cattle owner, 
examining how the level and variability of returns is influenced by the terms of alternative 
contracts.   
   6
Data and Methods 
Stochastic simulation using winter grazing enterprise budgets is used to generate 500 
observations on returns over variable costs (RVC) for stocker ownership and three different 
contracting options for both cattle owners and caretakers.  Grazing returns are primarily 
influenced by cattle prices (in the case of stocker ownership) and by cattle performance 
(reflected in average daily gain and death loss).  These parameters are varied within a winter 
grazing budget from the University of Georgia Agricultural Economics Department to simulate 
the 500 RVC observations.  Contracting options differ in the rate and method of payment as well 
as in which costs are paid by the cattle owner and which by the caretaker.  In all simulations, 
budgets assume that 150 head of 4-weight steers are placed on winter annual pasture.  Table 2 
summarizes the four contracting options compared in this study.   
  Empirical distributions of cattle prices and average daily gain (ADG) were used in 
simulating RVC values.  ADG values were derived from 13 gain/acre figures recorded in stocker 
grazing trials in central Mississippi from 1975 through 1988.  To convert gain/acre value into 
ADG values, a stocking rate of 1.5 head per acre and a grazing period of 170 days were assumed.  
These stocking rate and grazing period values are consistent with the production practices used 
in the Mississippi grazing trials. 
  Prices used in the simulation consist of Georgia auction market prices reported in 
Livestock, Meat, and Wool Weekly Summary and Statistics (USDA-AMS) from September 1980 
through May 2002.  To obtain observations on RVC from winter grazing, two prices are 
required: a fall stocker calf price and a spring feeder calf price.  In this simulation, a September – 
November average price for 400-500 pound steers was used along with a May average price for   7
700-800 pound steers.  In the simulation, prices were randomly selected from the empirical 
distribution in pairs: a fall stocker price and the associated feeder price for the following spring.  
  A death loss series for a winter grazing program was not available for use in this study.  
In order to generate a stochastic series for death loss, a gamma distribution with a mean of 2% 
and a standard deviation of 0.75 was used (Ã(á=5.33,â=0.375)).  For the 500 simulated 
observations, this distribution resulted in death loss values ranging from 0.30% to 5.37% with a 
mean of 2.00%.  Table 3 provides descriptive statistics on the price and ADG data used in 
developing the simulation model for this study.   
  The University of Georgia budgets used in this study do assume that some supplemental 
feeding is required, including a starter ration and some hay.  While the expense for starter ration 
may be fairly consistent from year to year, supplemental hay expense likely varies from year to 
year depending on pasture conditions (influenced primarily, of course, by weather).  In the 
simulation, these expenses are not varied.  Likewise, there may be some correlation between 
average daily gain and hay expense.  If pasture conditions are poor (excellent), ADG will be low 
(high) and hay expense high (low).  Data were not available for incorporating this hypothesized 
correlation into the simulation.  For that reason, feed expense is not stochastic in this simulation.   
Results 
A summary of the simulated RVC values is presented in Table 4.  Note that, not surprisingly, 
direct ownership (i.e., owning stockers that are grazed on owned or rented pasture) results in 
higher returns than any of the contracting options for both cattle owners and caretakers; however, 
it also results in the most variable returns.  Of the four contracting options, from the caretaker’s 
perspective, Contract 2 results in the highest average returns, while from the cattle owner’s 
perspective, Contract 4 results in the highest average returns.   8
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  From the cattle owners’ perspective, none of the contracting options examined here 
compare very favorably with grazing owned cattle on owned (or rented) pasture, even for a very 
risk averse individual.  For all of the contract terms considered, a slight reduction in risk comes 
at the expense of a very significant reduction in returns.  For caretakers, it is not immediately 
obvious which stocker grazing option is optimal for a risk-averse individual.  Using a mean 
variance approach, Contracts 1 and 2 clearly dominate Contract 3 since they have a higher mean 
and a lower variance; however, ranking cattle ownership and the various contracting options is 
not possible using mean-variance analysis. 
  To clearly rank alternative grazing arrangements for producers of varying risk aversion 
levels, a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility function was used to convert RVC 
values to utility estimates.  The CRRA utility function is represented mathematically as 
(1)    
or 
(2)    
 
where Wi = W0 + RVCi, r is a risk aversion coefficient, and wi is the weight associated with each 
observation i.  Simulated ending wealth is represented by Wi, and initial wealth is represented by 
W0.  Initial wealth is assumed to be $200,000.  Utility values are calculated for risk aversion 
coefficients 1, 2, 3, and 4, with r=1 representing slightly risk averse and r=4 representing 
extremely risk averse.  
  By solving equation 1 for RVC, certainty equivalents (CE) can be calculated for each 
level of risk aversion.  The CE represents the lowest sure price for which a decision maker would 
be willing to sell a risky prospect (Hardaker, Huirne, and Anderson).  For any two alternatives i   9
and j, if CEi > CEj, then alternative i is preferred to j.  Calculated CE values are presented in 
Table 5.  These results indicate that for slightly to moderately risk averse caretakers (r£2) stocker 
ownership is preferred to any contracting option.  At any higher level of risk aversion, the 
preferred option is Contract 2.  Even for very risk averse caretakers, stocker ownership is 
preferred to contracting options 1, 3, or 4.  Also, as expected, for cattle owners of any level of 
risk aversion, grazing owned cattle on owned (or rented) pasture is preferred to contracting. 
Analysis of Alternative Contract Rates and Terms 
Sensitivity analysis was conducted to determine a grazing fee that would leave the decision 
maker (cattle owner or caretaker) indifferent between ownership and contracting.  Two different 
contractual arrangements were considered: one in which all medical and supplemental feed 
expenses are paid by the cattle owner (Contract A) and one in which these expenses are covered 
by the caretaker (Contract B).  To conduct this sensitivity analysis, CEs were calculated, again 
from 500 simulated observations on RVC, at a series of different grazing fee rates.  Table 6 
presents calculated CE values from the caretaker’s perspective.  Table 7 presents calculated CE 
values from the cattle owner’s perspective.  In both tables, results are presented for two levels of 
risk aversion (r=1 and r=3). 
  These results illustrate a potential difficulty in establishing contract grazing 
arrangements.  From the caretaker’s perspective, a slightly risk averse caretaker (r=1) would 
prefer to own cattle rather than graze somebody else’s cattle under contract at any grazing fee of 
less than approximately $31.35 per cwt of gain.  On the other hand, a similarly risk averse cattle 
owner would prefer turning cattle out on owned (or leased) pasture to grazing under contract at 
any grazing fee of greater than about $18.60 per cwt of gain.  In short, it seems that, in general, 
grazing fee arrangements that are attractive to pasture owners may not be particularly attractive   10
to cattle owners and vice versa.  This may, in fact, help explain why contract grazing is not a 
more common practice in the southeastern U.S. 
Clearly, it is important not to apply this principle too rigidly.  Otherwise, one would 
assume that contract grazing should never occur.  A number of factors other than the grazing fee 
also affect contract grazing decisions.  Cattle owners may face land and management (i.e., time) 
constraints that make it impossible for them graze all of their cattle on owned or leased land.  
Likewise, pasture owners may face capital constraints that make it impossible for them to own 
cattle (or as many cattle as they need to fully utilize their land resource).  In each of these cases, 
contracting could be an attractive option.   
  A final simulation was conducted to determine the impact of market price and animal 
performance on grazing fees.  In this analysis, a break-even grazing fee was calculated for both 
the cattle owner and the caretaker for Contract 1 (from Table 2) using the 500 simulated cattle 
prices, ADG, and death loss values.  The difference between the cattle owner’s break-even 
grazing fee and the caretaker’s break-even grazing fee represents profits to the entire system.  
These profits (or losses) were allocated between the owner and the caretaker according to the 
share of total variable costs paid by each.  In this manner an “equal-return” grazing fee was 
estimated for each of the 500 simulated observations.  The results of this simulation are 
summarized in Table 8.   
  Linear regression was performed to estimate the effect of market and animal performance 
variables on the “equal-return” grazing fee.  Using ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation, the 
following equation was estimated (with standard errors in parentheses below the estimated 
coefficients): 
(3)  GF = 51.55 + 0.30MARGIN – 8.10ADG + 1.15DL, 
  (0.62)  (0.01)  (0.25)  (0.11)   11
 
where GF is the equal-return grazing fee (in $/cwt of gain); MARGIN is the spring feeder calf 
price minus the associated fall stocker calf price (in $/cwt); ADG is the average daily gain 
achieved by grazing steers; and DL is the percentage death loss on grazing steers.  Using this 
equation, a “fair” grazing fee can be calculated for any assumed buy/sell margin, average daily 
gain, and death loss percentage.  Table 9 summarizes a number of such calculations.  Figures in 
Table 9 may provide a benchmark for evaluating grazing fees; however, they should be 
interpreted with caution.  These figures are based on returns calculated from a hypothetical 
budget.  This budget is representative of cattle owner and caretaker costs, but individual 
operators could have operating costs that differ significantly from those used in the budget.  
Also, the buy/sell margin, average daily gain, and death loss are all unknown at the time grazing 
decisions must be made.  Uncertainty regarding these factors will obviously affect grazing fee 
decisions by both cattle owners and caretakers. 
Summary and Conclusions 
Contract grazing of stocker calves may represent an important opportunity for many southeastern 
cattle producers.  Contract grazing could allow pasture owners to receive regular income from 
their land and labor resources while limiting the amount of capital that they have at risk.  This 
could be a particularly attractive option for producers with limited access to capital, those facing 
cash flow problems, or those whose financial position leaves them vulnerable to the level of 
financial risk associated with purchasing stocker calves.  From the cattle owner’s perspective, 
contracting could allow them to increase their investment in cattle in spite of land and/or 
management constraints.   
  One difficulty of evaluating contract grazing options is that very little about grazing 
contracts is standardized.  A virtually unlimited number of arrangements is possible, each   12
differing in some degree in who pays for inputs and who bears death loss and how compensation 
is provided.  This fact highlights the importance of having a written contract specifying all the 
details of the contract grazing arrangement. 
  In this study, four hypothetical contract grazing arrangements were compared to stocker 
ownership.  From both the perspectives of both cattle owners and caretakers, stocker ownership 
offered a higher level of returns than any of the contracts.  For caretakers, contracting offered a 
significant reduction in the variability of returns.  In fact, moderately risk averse caretakers 
would prefer contracting (under certain terms) to ownership of cattle.  Conversely, for cattle 
owners, reductions in risk were minimal so that even extremely risk averse cattle owners would 
not prefer any of the contracting options grazing considered here to grazing cattle on owned (or 
leased) pasture.  This result is consistent with previous research (Harrison et al.).   
  Using sensitivity analysis, this research illustrates one of the obstacles to the widespread 
use of contract grazing arrangements.  In general, from a cattle owner’s perspective, contract 
grazing is not a preferred option except at a grazing fee rate that is too low to be attractive to 
pasture owners.  Other factors can and obviously do override this concern (e.g., capital 
constraints that make it impossible for a pasture owner to obtain cattle directly or time 
constraints that make it difficult for a cattle owner to directly oversee the grazing operation).  
Still, this principle may help explain why contract grazing is not more common among cattle 
producers in the Southeast. 
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Table 1.  Cattle and Calf Inventory in Selected Southern States: January 1, 2002 
















calves as % 
of calf crop 
AL  25,000  750  680  60  41  14.9% 
AR  27,000  927  820  145  65  25.6 
FL  16,500  958  940  25  25  5.3 
GA  21,000  594  580  40  30  12.1 
KY  39,000  1,485  1,080  215  100  29.2 
LA  13,200  466  405  24  17  10.1 
MS  21,000  576  540  55  27  15.2 
NC  22,000  434  450  43  20  14.0 
SC  10,000  210  185  13  13  14.1 
TN  45,000  1,060  1,050  118  75  18.4 
VA  22,000  690  720  175  70  34.0 
             
U.S. Total  814,400  33,099.7  38,280.8  16,799.8  10,057.1   
South as % 
of U.S.  32.1%  24.6%  19.5%  5.4%  4.8%   
Source: Cattle.  USDA-NASS.  February 1, 2002   





Table 2.  Four Alternative Contract Grazing Agreements  
Payment 
Provisions  Contract 1  Contract 2  Contract 3  Contract 4 
$/head/month  $2.00  N/A  N/A  $14.00 
$/cwt of gain  $35.00  $40.00  $42.50  N/A 
Death loss covered 
by cattle owner  0%  2%  0%  0% 
Supplemental feed 
paid by  Caretaker  Caretaker  Caretaker  Owner 
Minerals paid by  Owner  Caretaker  Caretaker  Owner 
Medication & 
Implants paid by  Owner  Owner  Caretaker  Owner 
   15
 
Table 3.  Description of Price and Production Data Used in Comparing Stocker Ownership 
and Contracting Options 
Data Series  Average  Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
Stocker Price  $78.23  13.34  $58.13  $100.70 
Feeder Price  $65.48  9.24  $44.12  $82.62 
Average Daily Gain  2.19  0.38  1.54  2.83 
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Table 4.  Simulated Return Over Variable Cost Estimates for Stocker Ownership and Contracting Options 
  Own  Contract 1  Contract 2  Contract 3  Contract 4 
  Stockers  Caretaker  Owner  Caretaker  Owner  Caretaker  Owner  Caretaker  Owner 
Mean  $7,009  $5,519  $723  $6,599  -$397  $4,932  $1,220  $1,204  $5,375 
Std. Dev.  9,513  3,426  7,682  3,880  7,457  4,075  7,519  100  9,504 
Min.  -13,716  -1,605  -14,421  -1,069  -14,376  -3,473  -13,190  796  -15,158 
Max.  35,769  12,284  24,059  13,657  21,836  13,164  23,665  1,393  34,094 






Table 5.  Simulated Certainty Equivalent Values for Stocker Ownership and Contracting Options 
  Own  Contract 1  Contract 2  Contract 3  Contract 4 
r  Stockers  Caretaker  Owner  Caretaker  Owner  Caretaker  Owner  Caretaker  Owner 
1  $6,792  $5,490  $578  $6,563  -$535  $4,892  $1,081  $1,204  $5,157 
2  6,576  5,462  433  6,526  -672  4,851  942  1,204  4,940 
3  6,362  5,433  289  6,490  -808  4,811  805  1,204  4,724 
4  6,148  5,404  147  6,453  -943  4,770  668  1,204  4,509 
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Table 6.  Impact of Grazing Fee on Caretaker Certainty Equivalents 
  Contract A      Contract B   
Grazing Fee  r=1  r=3  Grazing Fee  r=1  r=3 
$30.50  $6,320.86  $6,278.86  $45.20  $6,400.44  $6,309.44 
30.60  6,376.79  6,334.52  45.30  6,456.31  6,364.94 
30.70  6,432.72  6,390.19  45.40  6,512.19  6,420.44 
30.80  6,488.65  6,445.85  45.50  6,568.07  6,475.94 
30.90  6,544.58  6,501.52  45.60  6,623.94  6,531.44 
31.00  6,600.51  6,557.18  45.70  6,679.82  6,586.93 
31.10  6,656.44  6,612.84  45.80  6,735.69  6,642.43 
31.20  6,712.37  6,668.50  45.90  6,791.56  6,697.92 
31.30  6,768.30  6,724.16  46.00  6,847.44  6,753.41 
31.40  6,824.23  6,779.82  46.10  6,903.31  6,808.90 
Note: CE for ownership of calves and ownership/rental of pasture is $6,791.88 for r=1 and $6,361.50 for r=3. 
 
 
Table 7.  Impact of Grazing Fee on Stocker Cattle Owner Certainty Equivalents 
  Contract A      Contract B   
Grazing Fee  r=1  r=3  Grazing Fee  r=1  r=3 
$18.40  $6,911.31  $6,577.83  $32.40  $6,937.52  $6,643.57 
18.50  6,853.40  6,520.27  32.50  6,879.55  6,585.83 
18.60  6,795.49  6,462.70  32.60  6,821.58  6,528.09 
18.70  6,737.58  6,405.13  32.70  6,763.61  6,470.34 
18.80  6,679.67  6,347.56  32.80  6,705.64  6,412.59 
18.90  6,621.76  6,289.99  32.90  6,647.68  6,354.85 
19.00  6,563.85  6,232.42  33.00  6,589.71  6,297.10 
Note: CE for ownership of calves and ownership/rental of pasture is $6,791.88 for r=1 and $6,361.50 for r=3. 
 
 
Table 8.  Break-even Grazing Fees for Cattle Owners and Caretakers Under Terms of 
Contract 1 
  Owner’s Break-even 
Grazing Fee 
Caretaker’s Break-
even Grazing Fee 
Equal Return 
Grazing Fee 
Average  $39.38  $30.15  $32.28 
Std. Dev.  13.79  5.65  4.63 
Minimum  4.44  21.34  22.58 
Maximum  74.09  44.90  51.28 
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Table 9.  Equal-Return Grazing Fees ($/cwt gain) Under Different Buy/Sell Margin and 
ADG Assumptions 
Buy/Sell            ADG           
Margin  1.50  1.60  1.70  1.80  1.90  2.0  2.10  2.20  2.30  2.40  2.50 
0.00  41.69  40.88  40.07  39.26  38.45  37.64  36.83  36.02  35.21  34.40  33.59 
-5.00  40.18  39.37  38.56  37.75  36.94  36.13  35.32  34.51  33.70  32.89  32.08 
-10.00  38.67  37.86  37.05  36.24  35.43  34.62  33.81  33.00  32.19  31.38  30.57 
-15.00  37.16  36.35  35.54  34.73  33.92  33.11  32.30  31.49  30.68  29.87  29.06 
-20.00  35.65  34.84  34.03  33.22  32.41  31.60  30.79  29.98  29.17  28.36  27.55 
-25.00  34.14  33.33  32.52  31.71  30.90  30.09  29.28  28.47  27.66  26.85  26.04 
Note: Death loss is assumed to be 2%.               
 
 
 
 